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The mythology of proportionality in the EU Court of Justice’s judgments on internet and 
fundamental rights. 
Filippo Fontanelli* 
Abstract: Proportionality is the tool of choice for the EU Court of Justice’s review of measures affecting the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights. The use of proportionality is normally beneficial, as it ensures that public 
authorities pursue public policies without any avoidable waste of fundamental rights protection. In the field of 
internet-based activities, however, certain recurrent elements make proportionality unfit for the purpose. This 
article argues against the systematic recourse to the mythology of proportionality in the judgments of the Court 
of Justice of the EU. Most instances of putative proportionality assessment are in fact window-dressing for 
pragmatic or policy-based arguments. The claim relies on a critical reading of the recent case law of the Court in 
internet-related disputes. Accordingly, it is preferable to abandon the proportionality test when certain factual 
conditions – which are commonplace in the digital milieu – prevail. 
Keywords: proportionality, fundamental rights, internet, Court of Justice of the European Union, adjudication, 
legal reasoning 
1. Introduction 
Society evolves over time and law must apply to an ever-changing substratum. This has always been 
the case and the application of EU law to internet-related matters is no exception.1 The practice of 
legal interpretation and application in this field is complicated by the engagement of fundamental 
                                                          
* filippo.fontanelli@ed.ac.uk, Lecturer in International Economic Law, University of Edinburgh. Sincere thanks to 
the Journal’s editors and referees. All views are attributable to the author only. A preliminary study on the topic 
was presented at the Bocconi University in Milan (October 2014). 
1 Niilo Jääskinen, ‘Internet et la Cour de Justice’, in Antonio Tizzano et al. (eds), La Cour de justice de l’Union 
européenne sous la présidence de Vassilios Skouris (2003-2015) (Bruylant 2015) 253-269. 
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rights (FRs), which also lend themselves to evolutive construction,2 because their formulation through 
principles requires actualisation in particular cases.3 
FR-adjudication concerning novel technologies occurs in an epistemic scene which changes 
continuously. Namely, its coordinates inevitably shift along two different axes. On the one hand, 
technological advancement causes social practices to reconfigure and take new shapes; on the other 
hand, the flexible application of general principles to specific circumstances cannot be assessed 
statically or a priori. The process of normative refinement required to regulate these activities can 
take place at the legislative level and/or through legal interpretation and application, including 
through the activity of judicial bodies. The nature of technological advancement makes it impossible 
to rely on a backward-looking analysis of established general practice to build appropriate analogies 
for the regulation of future circumstances. To be effective, refinement must instead take the form of 
reformative law-making (or judicial standard-setting) rather than codification or consolidation of 
practice. 
Whereas law cannot anticipate technological innovations, it should react to them as promptly as 
possible. As Advocate General Cruz Villalón noted, ‘there are currently many legal categories the 
conception and scope of which require a reconsideration where they affect social and commercial 
relationships occurring on the internet.’4 
This article raises a warning against received thinking. Namely, it posits that the proportionality 
test – as we know it – is an inadequate heuristic device to resolve legal disputes in which fundamental 
                                                          
2 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German LJ 1730, 1732; Christos L Rozakis, ‘The European Judge as Comparatist’ 
(2005) 80 Tul. L. Rev. 257, 260 (referring to the rudimentary nature of the provisions of the ECHR). 
3 This simplification draws from the famous notion of principles in Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously 
(HUP, 1978) 35, where he notes that rules determine the outcome of a dispute and, if they do not, they have 
been disregarded. Instead, ‘[p]rinciples do not work that way; they incline a decision one way, though not 
conclusively, and they survive intact when they do not prevail’. 
4 Joined Cases C-509/09 eDate Advertising GmbH and C-161/10 Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN 
Limited  ECR 2011, I-10269, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, para 31. 
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rights are affected by internet activities.5 Consequently, judgments turning on a determination of 
proportionality are ultimately ill-founded or seek artificial authority for conclusions based on policy 
trade-offs.6 The language of proportionality has become a mythology,7 a shorthand for legitimacy. It 
used to imply correctness through careful judicial evaluation, but has gradually turned into a self-
serving proclamation. Proportionality is a sign that feeds its own signified, it is a myth in which the 
form draws its nourishment from an impoverished meaning.8   
Constitutional (that is, FR-based) adjudication in the hands of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (the Court) is increasingly impracticable and the discipline of internet-based activities that have 
FR-implications is better left to regulators or to different ways of judicial reasoning. This conclusion is 
reminiscent of Balkin’s own regarding the realisation (regarding free speech) that case-law could 
hardly moderate the digital brave new world. Technical and regulatory decisions are preferable to 
constitutional elaboration through judicial precedents:  
Protecting free speech values in the digital age will be less and less a problem of constitutional 
law – although these protections will remain quite important – and more and more a problem 
of technology and administrative regulation.9 
                                                          
5 On the risks of basing moral and legal judgments on generic heuristic short-cuts, see Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Moral 
heuristics’ (2005) 28(4) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 531. 
6 Criticism of proportionality in FR-adjudication is commonplace. See Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An 
assault on human rights?’ (2009) 7(3) I-Con 468; Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, ‘Proportionality—a benefit 
to human rights? Remarks on the I·CON controversy’ (2012) 10(3) I-Con 687. For a response to this criticism, see 
Kai Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the critics’ (2012) 10(2) I-Con 709. On the specific problem of 
incommensurability contrast Paul-Erik N Veel, ‘Incommensurability, Proportionality, and Rational Legal Decision-
making’ (2010) 4(2) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 178 with Timothy AO Endicott, ‘Proportionality and 
Incommensurability’ in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller, Gregoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule 
of Law (CUP 2014) 311. For a critique of the allocation of evidentiary onera within the test, see Julian Rivers, 
‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 409. 
7 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Seuil 1957), last chapter: ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’. 
8 Ibid, (English translation, Vintage 2000) 118: ‘The meaning will be for the form like an instantaneous reserve 
of history, a tamed richness, which it is possible to call and dismiss in a sort of rapid alternation’. 
9 Jack M Balkin, ‘The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age’ (2008) 36 Pepp. LR 427, 441. Balkin discusses the 
continuing relevance of the Constitution’s First Amendment on free speech, arguing somewhat similarly to the 
gist of this article that the technological revolution amounts to ‘a transition of enormous irony. At the very 
moment that our economic and social lives are increasingly dominated by information technology and 
information flows, the First Amendment seems increasingly irrelevant to the key free speech battles of the 
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The assumption that the Court performs constitutional adjudication requires a clarification.10 
Substantively, the Court reviews the compatibility of EU secondary legislation with the Treaties and 
international law. Fundamental rights provisions are among the primary norms which secondary 
legislation must respect to be valid. In the present analysis, the interpretation or validity of EU law 
acts11 or national law implementing EU law turn on their compliance with fundamental rights: this kind 
of judicial review is, in the substance, typically constitutional. Besides the substantive affinity, the 
Court has also a formal mandate to engage in constitutional adjudication. Namely, it arbitrates the 
vertical division of powers between Member States and the Union, as domestic constitutional courts 
often do.12 In particular, the review of secondary legislation for compliance with Treaty law ultimately 
implicates the compliance with the principle of conferral. Formally, therefore, respect of Treaty law is 
a safeguard against undue encroachment of Member States’ competences. 
This article introduces a distinction between internet-native rules and other rules that might be 
applicable in internet-related cases (section 2). The purpose of this distinction is to focus on the 
constitutional component of the Court’s case-law, which is more clearly visible when it considers the 
compatibility of internet-native rules with fundamental rights. Section 3 uses the Google Spain case 
as an illustration of the shortcomings of proportionality in this field. The analysis develops in Section 
4, which discusses other judgments to support the idea that the Court is less engaged in actual 
proportionality than in a pragmatic moderation of conflicting interests. The core argument of this 
                                                          
future. Or, more precisely, the judge-made doctrines that I teach in my First Amendment classes seem 
increasingly irrelevant’.  
10 On the Court’s activity as constitutional tribunal, see Eleanor Sharpston and Geert De Baere, ‘The Court of 
Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator’ in Anthony Arnull et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? (Hart 
2011) 123; Bo Vesterdorf, ‘A constitutional court for the EU?’ (2006) 4(4) I-Con 607; Andreas M Donner, ‘The 
Constitutional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (1974) 11 CMLR 127; Francis G 
Jacobs, ‘Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional Court?’ in Deirdre Curtin et al. 
(eds), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law: Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T. 
F. O’Higgins (Butterworths 1992) 25. 
11 Submitted to the Court under Articles 263 or 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). 
12 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Comparing constitutional review by the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme 
Court’ (2006) 4(4) I-Con 618, 623. 
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work, synthesised in the conclusive section, is that the Court should let go of the proportionality 
parlance and expose the policy-oriented thrust of its decisions on internet-related matters. 
This article does not purport to criticise proportionality in general, the use of balancing by the 
regulator or the generic taking into account of conflicting interests in adjudication. The narrow claim 
is that the three-step proportionality test is helpless to arbitrate FR-implications in internet disputes. 
Möller’s warning is wise: ‘[w]e should assess the value of proportionality not by asking whether there 
are cases where it does not add much, but by asking whether there are cases where it does’.13 
However, in the digital arena, proportionality is structurally unable to add anything, most of the times. 
Its damage to legal reasoning far outreaches the benefit, and should be noted. 
2. Regulatory connection of internet-native and non-internet norms 
FR-adjudication inevitably entails the interpretation and application of principles. Regulation of 
conduct relating to the use of internet, conversely, can be very thorough and comprise detailed rules. 
In fact, the EU has legislated copiously in the field.14 The process of refinement of the nexus between 
EU law and internet activities has resulted in a flurry of regulation. This process has aimed to achieve, 
maintain and renew ‘regulatory connection’,15 that is, the alignment between regulation and 
regulated practices. New legal disciplines have emerged governing the impact that internet 
technologies have on several human activities (production, distribution and consumption of 
information, access to intellectual products, entertainment, marketing strategies, management of 
personal data, use of intangible networks to support the activity of public entities). Resultantly, the 
EU relies on a wide basis of internet-native regulation. Other EU rules (non-internet specific) antedate 
internet or do not mention it specifically, but nevertheless apply to its use. When EU and domestic 
                                                          
13 Möller n 6, 727. Emphasis in the original. 
14 For instance, see Directive 95/46; Directive 2000/31; Regulation 45/2001; Directive 2002/22; Directive 
2002/58 (replacing Directive 97/66); Directive 2006/24. 
15 Roger Brownsword, ‘The shaping of our on-line worlds: getting the regulatory environment right’ (2012) 20(4) 
IJL&Inf. Tech. 249, 263-265. 
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judges apply rules that are not internet-specific to internet matters, regulatory connection must take 
place in the courtroom, more or less ad hoc. 
The subject-matter of this article is the Court’s constitutional case-law in the digital milieu. The 
cases are selected to gauge the process of evolutive refinement described above, whereby 
adjudication secures alignment between the digital world and a subset of EU law, i.e., its fundamental 
rights standards. All the disputes considered fall in a casuistic spectrum of EU applicable norms (the 
application of EU law is a prerequisite for the CJEU to exercise jurisdiction). At one end, the Court 
interprets or applies internet-native rules and the refinement relates to their compliance with 
fundamental rights. At the other end, the Court must apply rules that are not internet-specific to an 
internet-related situation; this might result from technology advancements that have not been 
matched by regulatory action, or from the application of rules drafted deliberately to be ‘technology 
neutral’,16 which require ‘purposive interpretation in the courts’.17 
In the latter case, the regulatory connection hinges on the optimisation of existing rules to new 
practices, and the constitutional duty of the Court to monitor compliance with fundamental rights is 
mixed with its task to secure regulatory connection through the interpretation of non-internet rules. 
Quite simply, the updated application of the rule of conduct must also respect fundamental rights. 
This is a routine check that the Court must perform on all EU rules.18 
Two examples illustrate this distinction, which is not clear-cut but is helpful to appreciate the 
Court’s work. 
Type 1: Consistent interpretation of internet-native rule to fundamental rights 
                                                          
16 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Should ICT regulation be technology-neutral?’ in Bert-Jaap Koops et al. (eds), Starting Points 
for ICT Regulation. Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-Liners (TMC Asser 2006) 77. 
17 Brownsword n 15, 265. 
18 The FR-compliance of all acts of the EU, including normative sources, is mandated by Art. 51 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Domestic measures implementing EU law are similarly subject to the Charter. See, 
generally, Filippo Fontanelli, ‘National Measures and the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights–
Does curia.eu Know iura.eu?’ (2014) 14(2) HRLR 231-265. 
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Art. 15 of Directive 2000/31 (on e-Commerce)19 provides that ‘Member States shall not impose a 
general obligation on providers … to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a 
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.’ 
This article forms part of a set of provisions which grant a ‘safe harbour’ to selected categories of 
internet service providers. These are exempted from liabilities by reason of their content-neutral 
activity (caching, hosting, mere conduit).20 Article 15 clarifies that the safe harbour cannot be 
frustrated by imposing filtering duties on these providers. The application of this internet-specific rule 
might raise issues of compatibility with fundamental rights. For instance, certain stakeholders might 
question the compatibility of this rule with their right to protection of property, insofar as this 
provision spares internet service providers from a duty of monitoring and preventing a) the use of IP-
rights (see Promusicae,21 L’Oréal,22 Scarlet,23 SABAM,24 Bonnier25, PRCA,26 Papasavas27); b) access to 
pictures taken and distributed illegally (see Max Mosley v Google, French28 and German29 orders); c) 
the exchange of tickets for which re-sale is prohibited (see UK SC’s judgment Rugby Football Union v. 
Viagogo30). Type 1 cases involve balancing.31 
                                                          
19 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, Official Journal L 178, 
17.7.2000, 1–16 
20 See Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31. For a commentary and a comparison with the corresponding US 
regime, see Miquel Peguera, ‘The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis 
of Some Common Problems’ (2009) 32 Col. JL& Arts 481.  
21 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) [2008] ECR I-271. 
22 Case C-324/09 L'Oréal and others [2011] ECR I-6011. 
23 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] ECR I-11959. 
24 Case C-360/10 SABAM (judgment of 16 February 2012). 
25 Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio and others (judgment of 19 April 2012). 
26 Case C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others 
(judgment of 5 June 2014). 
27 Case C-291/13 Sotiris Papasavvas v O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etaireia Ltd and Others (judgment of 11 September 
2014). 
28 TGI Paris, 17e ch., 6 November 2013, RG 11/07970, Max Mosley c. Google Inc et Google France, text available 
at http://droitdu.net/2013/11/tgi-paris-17e-ch-6-novembre-2013-rg-1107970-max-mosley-c-google-france-et-
google-inc/. 
29 Landgericht Hamburg, 24 January 2014, case 324 O 264/11, text available at http://tlmd.in/u/1456. 
30 The Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd [2012] UKSC 55 (21 November 2012), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2012/55.html.  
31 For instance, see how the Court determined the legality of a court injunction requiring an internet provider to 
monitor the users’ activity, in Scarlet n 23, 40-41: ‘that injunction would require the [provider] to carry out 
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Type 2: Update of non-internet specific rule 
Art. 5(3) of Regulation 44/200132 provides that ‘[a] person domiciled in a Member State may, in 
another Member State, be sued: … in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for 
the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.’ 
In this case, the interpretation of this general principle of territorial connection might prove critical 
when the alleged wrongdoing and its effects (the ‘harmful event’) take place over the internet. For 
web-based defamation, indeed, it is doubtful whether ‘the place’ where the event occur or might 
occur is any State where the incriminated webpage is merely accessible. If so, the defendant could be 
sued in any State of the world where an internet connection exists.33 
From this example (and others34) it is clear that fundamental rights are somewhat ancillary to the 
main legal question (i.e., whether a simple possibility to access the defamatory material online 
qualifies as ‘harmful event,’ and whether the location of the internet user identifies where the 
‘harmful event’ occurs for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction). In this case, fundamental rights 
guarantees inform the finding of the Court only insofar as it must be ensured that the application of 
Art. 5(3) of Regulation 44/2001 does not restrict disproportionately the plaintiff’s right to privacy and 
the ensuing right to seek judicial protection for it.35 Type 2 cases involve primarily legal subsumption 
                                                          
general monitoring, something which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31. In order to assess 
whether that injunction is consistent with European Union law, account must also be taken of the requirements 
that stem from the protection of the applicable fundamental rights’ (emphasis added). 
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Official Journal L 012 , 16.01.2001. 
33 An extreme case is Case C-441/13 Hejduk (judgment of 22 January 2015). 
34 For instance, consider the Court’s reflection on the application of Article 5(3) of Directive 89/104, which lists 
the exclusive uses of a trademark by the holder, to the purchase from Google AdWords of words identical to a 
trademark, in Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECR I-2417, para 66: ‘an 
interpretation according to which only the uses mentioned in that list are relevant would fail to have regard for 
the fact that that list was drawn up before the full emergence of electronic commerce and the advertising 
produced in that context. It is those electronic forms of commerce and advertising which can, by means of 
computer technology, typically give rise to uses which differ from those listed’. 
35 This was one of the issue in the cases eDate and Martinez n 4. 
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(i.e., the determination of whether a norm applies to a set of facts), to which any FR-balancing – if any 
– is incidental.36 
This distinction is relevant because it allows discerning the parts of the Court’s reasoning which 
use FR-argumentation as a decisive thrust towards the finding, as opposed to a simple standard of 
legality applied by way of routine. To simplify, Type 1 cases have a clearer constitutional imprint, on 
average, because the reasoning is free from false positives. The evolutive component in Type 2 cases, 
instead, is often about updating pre-internet rules rather than about FR-based consistent 
interpretation. In this sense, Type 1 cases are noise-free, because they are less concerned with 
regulatory connection; the judicial reasoning on fundamental rights is at the forefront.  
Make no mistake: regulatory connection is critical and probes the ability of the Court to mould the 
interpretation of EU law to modern needs. However, when Type 1 reasoning is deployed, the 
interpretive exercise regards precisely (and exclusively) the fundamental rights standards. To simplify, 
argumentation of the first category (dealing with internet-native rules) calls upon the Court to 
interpret fundamental rights as living instruments, thus exalting the connection between regulation 
and fundamental rights, not between technology and regulation. It forces the Court to devise the 
particularisation of human rights principles for new factual predicaments and legal regulations, often 
without precedents that can apply by analogy.37 Type 1 reasoning is therefore more directly 
constitutional, in the limited sense explained. Its deployment is clearly visible in the application of 
internet-native rules, but it can be traced also when Type 2 rules apply. Simply, there can be hybrid 
cases where the updating of non-internet-specific rules occurs alongside, or even through, FR-based 
arguments appealing to the balancing discretion of the Court. If the Type 1/2 distinction is relatively 
clear, any case can be decoded without worrying too much about whether it is a pure example of 
                                                          
36 For a distinction between subsumption and balancing, and an attempt to describe the latter process as a 
neutral process (like the former), see Robert Alexy, ‘On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison’ 
(2003) 16(4) Ratio Juris 433. 
37 Thomas M Scanlon, ‘Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values’ (2004) 74 Ford. LR 1477. 
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either category. Most cases are not pure specimens. Yet tracing the constitutional undercurrent of 
each is easier by isolating it from the concurring elements of the Court’s reasoning. It allows to 
distinguish amidst the Court’s reasoning ‘constitutional connection’ (alignment between rules and 
fundamental rights) from ‘regulatory connection’. 
Two recent Type 2 cases (PRCA38 and Papasavvas39) illustrate how regulatory connection works 
and why these cases are not ideal to observe the Court’s handling of fundamental rights. The disputes 
revolved around the potential liabilities of internet service providers for infringement of intellectual 
property rights and the possible application of a safe-harbour. They are exemplary of the potential for 
litigation in circumstances of regulatory disconnection, actual or alleged. In each case, there was a far-
fetched claim. In PRCA, a licensing agency claimed that the appearance of a website’s content on a 
computer screen was, in and of itself, an instance of reproduction requiring a specific clearance for 
the use of any IPs contained on the website.40 The defendant objected that the appearance on the 
screen of a website’s content was a ‘temporary act of reproduction’ incidental and essential to the 
mere viewing of webpages, and that it was therefore exempted from the IP regime.41 Conversely, in 
Papasavvas, a news company argued that the publication its newspaper online was merely hosting 
and fell under the safe harbour of the e-commerce Directive (see above). Accordingly, the company 
claimed immunity from an action for defamation regarding articles it published online. 
Obviously, the Court rejected the characterisations offered by the licensing agency in PRCA and 
the newspaper company in Papasavvas. Even prima facie, on-screen projection of websites cannot 
require a separate authorisation of IP use, and the for-profit operation of an online newspaper cannot 
be considered a content-neutral conduit. However, attempts were made to stretch or limit the reach 
of the safe harbours in the applicable Directives, in a bid to trick the Court into an adjustment of the 
                                                          
38 n 26. 
39 n 27. 
40 That is, in addition to that required to upload content on the website. 
41 Under Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/299/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
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regulatory connection of norms that needed none. As preposterous as these attempts were, the Court 
needed to take them seriously. It declared that IP liability exemptions ‘must allow and ensure the 
development and operation of new technologies, and safeguard a fair balance between the rights and 
interests of rights holders and of users of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those 
technologies’.42 Whereas in the specific cases balancing was not required (the scope of the exemptions 
was clear), the quote bears testimony to the occasional blending of regulatory connection and right 
balancing in Type 2 reasoning.43 
The suggestion, above, that precedents are of little help for FR-based adjudication in internet 
matters requires a brief explanation. After all, there exists an established practice of human rights 
adjudication, both at the Court and in other jurisdictions from which it can draw inspiration. Yet, 
internet-related activities fit hardly into the traditional models of fundamental right conflicts: we need 
new bottles for the new wine.44 As a matter of legal technique, application of FR principles to digital 
activities is less a question of subsumption of new facts under existing standards than it is a question 
of setting new policies. The best way to illustrate the unsettling novelty of internet-based activity is 
through selected cases. The discussion below remarks the aspects of these cases which are capable of 
generalisation; likewise the commentaries thereon are arguably valid in general and not only ad casos. 
The precursor in this gallery is the Lindqvist case.45 A volunteer catechist uploaded the personal 
information about some colleagues on a webpage, without their consent. From the factual 
background of the main proceedings, one can appreciate Mrs Lindqvist’s good faith (she promptly 
                                                          
42 PRCA n 38, para 24. 
43 A less obvious case was the qualification of Google – in its capacity as AdWords, providing advertising services 
– as a neutral subject storing information under Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31 or, instead, as a subject with 
IP-related liabilities. See Google France n 34, paras 106 ff. 
44 Variations of this metaphor are commonplace in the discussion of internet regulation. See for instance Martin 
H Redish, ‘Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional 
Evolution’ (1998) 38 Jurimetrics 575; Chris Reed, Internet law: text and materials (CUP 2004) 173 (“Old wine in 
new bottles: traditional transactions in the Internet environment”); John P Barlow, ‘The Economy of Ideas’ 
(WIRED 2.03 1994) http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html. 
45  C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971. For a comment, see Ludovic Coudray, ‘Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist’ 
(2004) 41(5) CMLR 1361. 
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removed the information when things got serious). However, criminal prosecution was launched, and 
Mrs Lindqvist had to endure it: this is a watershed case, symbolising internet’s loss of innocence – or 
legal impunity. Among the relevant issues, the Court considered whether the mere fact that the 
incriminated webpages were accessible anywhere in the world made Mrs Lindqvist liable for transfer 
of the personal information to a third country, a practice restricted under Directive 95/46.46 The 
reasoning of the Court is critical and exemplary: 
Given … the state of development of the internet at the time Directive 95/46 was drawn up … 
one cannot presume that the Community legislature intended the expression transfer [of 
data] to a third country’ to cover the loading, by an individual … of data onto an internet page, 
even if those data are thereby made accessible to persons in third countries with the technical 
means to access them.  
If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean that there is transfer [of data] to a 
third country every time that personal data are loaded onto an internet page, that transfer 
would necessarily be a transfer to all the third countries where there are the technical means 
needed to access the internet. The special regime provided for by Chapter IV of the directive 
would thus necessarily become a regime of general application, as regards operations on the 
internet. Thus, if the Commission found, pursuant to Article 25(4) of Directive 95/46, that even 
one third country did not ensure adequate protection, the Member States would be obliged 
to prevent any personal data being placed on the internet. 
On its face, this is a schoolbook example of a Type 2 question: update of a non-internet rule to a world-
cum-internet. However, it reveals the Court’s readiness to alter the balance of established principles, 
if only slightly. The rationale of the applied rule is to prevent that personal data be diffused where 
insufficient guarantees exist for their protection. If the rationale is valid, indeed, internet amplifies 
                                                          
46 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official 
Journal L 281 , 23/11/1995, 31-50, see in particular Article 25. 
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this concern indefinitely; this much is unquestionable. The protection of the affected parties would 
then require Member States ‘to prevent any personal data being placed on the internet.’ However, 
the Court discarded this conclusion as absurd, implicitly relying on a reapportioning of the 
responsibilities based on a new analysis of expected costs, that is, a covert utilitarian assessment. 
Since anybody uploading any personal data online would likely to incur liability, this liability is lifted, 
even if it was effectively designed to protect a fundamental right. 
Invoking arguments relating to the original intention of the legislator (that could not foresee the 
functioning of internet) and a sloppy reasoning ex absurdo (every uploader would be liable) the Court 
produced a Type 1 determination in disguise, where strict proportionality determined the outcome. 
Specifically, it altered the established balance between the right to privacy and the right to impart 
information, acknowledging that the current social and technological situation validates an 
irreversible erosion of the former in favour of the latter. In a sense, this judgment has inadvertently 
signalled the demotion of privacy protection to a policy objective (down from fundamental right). It 
also raises the question whether proportionality is a valid tool to manage the impact of new 
technologies on fundamental rights. 
3. Proportionality between fundamental rights in digital matters – unworkable formulae 
A constant of constitutional adjudication in Europe is the use of the proportionality test to balance 
competing values.47 The European Union applies a homonymous principle (alongside subsidiarity) to 
prevent its rules from encroaching on Member States’ competences,48 but it should be noted that 
what is examined here is exclusively the use of proportionality as a judicial test, distilled from repeated 
                                                          
47 A history of the principle is provided in Eric Engle, ‘The General Principle of Proportionality and Aristotle’ 
(2013) in Liesbeth Huppens-Cluysenaer and Nuno MMS Coelho (eds), Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: 
Theory, Practice and Justice (Springer 2013) 265. 




use.49 Other intimations of the principle and other instances of balancing lato sensu (for instance, the 
balancing inherent in policy-making) are without the narrow scope of this critique. 
Proportionality, or the process that the test entails, is a defining element of constitutionalism 
globally.50 The test of proportionality is normally used to assess the justification of restrictions to 
fundamental rights caused by private or, more commonly, public measures.51 A certain proportion 
must exist between the interference to a given right and the benefit that that interference brings to 
another right or public interest. Proportionality has become a general principle of EU law52 and has 
informed the case-law of the ECtHR,53 under the moniker of necessity. 
Roughly, the proportionality test used by the Court traces the one developed by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (the BvfG)54 and theorised as a prototype by Robert Alexy.55 It is a three-
step test informed by the principle of Pareto-optimisation56; each step ensures that the measure 
under scrutiny is efficient, that is, there cannot be any unnecessary waste of rights’ protection. It is a 
device of FR-maximation. The measure must be suitable to achieve the goal it is designed for (step 1) 
and must be, among those equally suitable and reasonably available, the least encroaching on the 
right restricted (step 2). The third step, usually called proportionality stricto sensu, requires weighing 
the values at stake, when it is inevitable that some of them must suffer a restriction.57 Again, the 
purpose is to preserve efficiency: a measure is disproportionately restrictive of a right if its 
                                                          
49 On the ‘cut-and-paste’ approach of the Court of Justice, which uses judicial tests codified in its own precedents, 
see Jan Komarek, ‘Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent’ (2013) 61 AJCL 149. 
50 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Colum. 
JTL 72; Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality and balancing in WTO law: a comparative 
perspective’ (2006) 42 Tex. ILJ 371; T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 
YLJ 943. 
51 Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and variable intensity of review’ (2006) 65(1) CLJ 174. 
52 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 ELJ158. 
53 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002). 
54 The seminal case is Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958). 
55 Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional rights, balancing, and rationality’ (2003) 16(2) Ratio Juris 131. 
56 Aurelien Portuese, ‘Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency’ (2013) 19(5) ELJ 612. 




contribution to the competing value is inferior to the restriction caused, in terms of intensity. The test, 
at a closer look, invites to a comparison between states of the world (rather than values as such): one 
in which the interference operates and one where it does not. 
This “Disproportionality Rule”58 is defined by the BvfG – convolutely but correctly – as follows: 
An interference with a constitutional right is disproportional if it is not justified by the fact that 
the omission of this interference would give rise to an interference with another principle (or 
with the same principle with respect to other persons or in other respects), provided that this 
latter interference is at least as intensive as the first one.59 
The proportionality test has been for decades the Court’s tool of choice to deliver judgments in hard 
cases without forfeiting its legitimacy. Proportionality’s high level of proceduralisation and its 
operation reminiscent of a mathematical formula facilitate the thankless task to second-guess 
Member States’ preferences and review EU law’s compliance with FRs. This section discusses the use 
of proportionality and FR-adjudication in selected judgments. 
The case of Google Spain,60 like Lindqvist, is a hybrid of Type 1 and 2. Unlike in Lindqvist, however, 
the Type 1 component (the evolutionary interpretation of fundamental rights) is not disguised. The 
facts warrant a synthetic account. Mr Costeja Gonzalez, a martyr of the digital age if ever there was 
one, Googled his own name on one fateful day of 2009. The first results were links to the digitalised 
copy of the 1998 edition of a local newspaper, reporting the notice of a public auction on real estate 
properties, including his own, seised to recover social security debts. He requested Google to remove 
these links from the results of a search under his name, invoking his right to privacy. More specifically, 
                                                          
58 Alexy, Constitutional rights n 55, 139. 
59 Ibid., from the Titanic judgment, BVerfGE vol. 86, 1 (1992). 
60 Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google (judgment of 13 May 2014). 
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he invoked a right to have certain past events not reported in widely and easily accessible documents 
lacking an overriding public interest.61 
First, we can observe the Type 2 component of the ruling. The Court considered a gateway 
question, namely whether Google qualified as controller of personal data under Directive 95/46. 
Google claimed that it did not, because it only performed a content-blind indexing of all words 
uploaded online, to populate search results for its users.62 The Advocate General, after a short 
reflection on how internet has taken EU law by surprise,63 advocated a ‘rule of reason’ akin to the 
Lindqvist rationale.64 Drawing support from the Article 29 Working Party reports, he concluded that 
holding Google responsible for the managing of personal data on the webpages listed would lead to 
absurd results.65 The Advocate General’s approach is indeed reminiscent of Lindqvist: subsumption 
(the application of the Directive to Google’s acts) is determined through a reasoning ex absurdo 
regarding practical consequences. Regulatory connection is managed through proportionality: Type 1 
and Type 2 are entangled. The Court instead rejected Google’s argument that its listing entailed an 
automated processing without meaningful editorial intervention.66 Google, by indexing online data, 
performs a deliberate commercial activity that can attract liability. Accordingly, Google is a controller 
under the Directive (a Type 2 finding).67 
                                                          
61 Two insightful commentaries are Eleni Frantziou, ‘Further Developments in the Right to be Forgotten: The 
European Court of Justice's Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de 
Proteccion de Datos’ (2014) 14 HRLR 761; John W. Kropf, ‘Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD). Case C-131/12’ (2014) 108(3) AJIL 502. 
62 On the nature of indexing performed by search engines and the algorithms used, see Emily B Laidlaw, ‘Private 
power, public interest: An examination of search engine accountability’ (2009) 17(1) IJL& Tech. 113, 128-133. 
63 Google Spain n 60, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 29: ‘the potential scope of application of the Directive in the 
modern world has become be [sic] surprisingly wide’. 
64 Ibid, para 30. 
65 Ibid, paras 89-90. 
66 Contrast this characterisation with Google’s own statement that search results are a form of protected free 
speech, made in US proceedings. Google’s position was frequently upheld, see for instance S. Louis Martin v. 
Google Inc., case number CGC 14 539972, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San 
Francisco, order of 13 November 2014. Google also commissioned a scientific paper that supports this notion, 
see Eugene Volokh and Donald M Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, April 20, 
2012 at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf.  
67 Google Spain n 60, paras 32-34. 
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The openly constitutional reasoning, however, is deployed in the Type 1 part of the judgment. The 
Court laid the groundwork for its determination noting that the outcome, seemingly framed as a 
question of principle, depended on the context. Quite simply, information loaded online is too readily 
available, to anyone. Availability of truthful information published lawfully has become a problem – 
not a matter of concern in pre-internet times.68 Now, instead, regulation is required to manage the 
negative externalities of this information overload. This is partly due to how good online search 
engines are: information is only as public as search engines makes it accessible. 
The Court concluded that the search provider is a controller which processes personal data. 
Therefore, if Google refuses to remove certain links from the results of a name-based search upon 
request, State regulatory agencies can review the application and order the removal.69 This order can 
be granted when the results of a search entail an excessive interference in the data subject’s private 
life, without a concurring (and overriding) justification. Because time soothes out some of the available 
justifications based on public interest, this finding was saluted as establishing a ‘right to be forgotten.’ 
The resulting instruction of the Court, which read into the applicable rules of the Directive a specific 
duty (for the controller) and a right (for the data subject), stems from an overt use of proportionality. 
The passage where the reasoning of the CJEU reveals the use of proportionality stricto sensu calls 
for closer analysis: 
As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general 
                                                          
68  Ibid, para 80: ‘It must be pointed out at the outset that …  processing of personal data, such as that at issue 
in the main proceedings, carried out by the operator of a search engine is liable to affect significantly the 
fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by means of that engine 
is carried out on the basis of an individual’s name, since that processing enables any internet user to obtain 
through the list of results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found 
on the internet — information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, 
without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty — 
and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with 
those rights of the data subject is heightened on account of the important role played by the internet and search 
engines in modern society, which render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous.’ 
69 Ibid, para 99. 
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public by its inclusion in such a list of results, it should be held … that those rights override, as 
a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest 
of the general public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s 
name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the 
role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights 
is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion 
in the list of results, access to the information in question.70 
This excerpt contrasts at least four discrete principles/values. First, the data subject’s ‘right to oblivion’ 
(in turn an elaboration of her rights to private life and data protection under Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, read through the ‘compelling reasons’ under Article 14(a) of the Directive). Second, the 
operator’s economic interest, protected by Articles 15-17 of the Charter. Third, the public’s right to 
impart and obtain information, protected by Article 11 of the Charter. Fourth, unspecified ‘particular 
reasons’ that could tip the balance in favour of the general public’s interest at the expense of the data 
subject’s own. 
Balancing four rights is a devilish task even if we assume, for the sake of ease, that a given measure 
x can only either respect or breach each of them (that is, we disregard the degree of contribution to 
the achievement of each right and the intensity of the breach thereof71). A mere head-count does not 
work: the Court itself noted that the data subject’s right prevails over two competing interests (of the 
public and of the economic operator). Adding the analysis of the intensity of the measure’s marginal 
impact on the enjoyment of each right,72 it would perhaps be possible to determine it statically.73 For 
                                                          
70 Ibid, para 97. 
71 On the problem of commensurability between values and between interferences to values, see Niels Petersen, 
‘How to Compare the Length of Lines to the Weight of Stones: Balancing and the Resolution of Value Conflicts 
in Constitutional Law’ (2013) 14 GLJ 1387. For a discussion of how to represent commensurate values without 
using numerical indications, see Giovanni Sartor, ‘Logic of Proportionality: Reasoning with Non-Numerical 
Magnitudes’ (2013) 14 GLJ 1419, 1429 ff. 
72 Aharon Barak, ‘Proportionality and Principled Balancing’ (2010) 4 L&Ethics HR 1, 8. 
73 That is, we could try to analyse its collective ‘realisation-impact’ across the relevant values. Sartor n 71, 1436: 
‘[t]he realisation-impact of an action α on a value v is the difference between the realisation-quantities of v 
resulting from and ∅ [the status quo]’. 
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instance, it could be agreed that the solution envisaged by the Court protected the rights of Mr Costeja 
Gonzalez and of those like him from a substantial harm, restricting slightly the interests of the public 
to know about their past, as well as the newspaper’s right to inform the public about it through online 
diffusion. It also imposed a significantly burdensome restriction on the right to exercise a business 
onto Google and other search engines. The Court, however, did not explain how these magnitudes 
relate to, possibly off-set, each other. 
It is not clear whether the Court even attempted to factor into the equation the degree of 
restriction of all values involved. In fact, certain wording suggests instead that privacy prevails by 
default over freedom of information and of conducting business: 
[the rights under] Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter … override, as a rule, not only the economic 
interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in 
having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name.74 
It cannot be conclusively excluded that the Court performed an accurate proportionality test but, since 
this does not emerge from the ruling, we have to re-create it and compare the results of the actual 
decision with the hypothetical exercise. It is doubtful that the “Disproportionality Rule” could clarify 
the calculus. 
Under this rule, the solution envisaged by the Court is proportionate insofar as its absence would 
determine a graver breach of rights than the restriction it causes (a negative aggregate utility balance 
with respect to r1, r2 … to rn).75 In other words, we should ascertain whether establishing Google’s 
obligation to enforce the ‘right to oblivion’ is less restrictive of the rights under Articles 11, 15, 16 and 
17 of the Charter than rejecting it would be of the rights under Articles 7 and 8. Each variable in the 
calculation is adjusted for the intensity of the restriction and, presumably, for the number of people 
                                                          
74 Google Spain n 60, para 99. Emphasis added. 
75 Sartor n 71, 1391: ‘[W]e do not compare the weight of the stone to the length of the line. Instead, we analyze 
whether we add proportionally more length to the line than we shed weight of the stone.’ 
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actually or potentially affected. In short, although certainly it is possible to explain the outcome of the 
Court along these lines, the outcome is not falsifiable because too many variables hinge on 
unprincipled approximation. An outcome opposite to the one indicated by the Court, indeed, would 
be just as plausible, owing to the magnitude of the burden imposed on Google and the number of 
people whose access to the relevant information is restricted. Unsurprisingly, the reasoning of the 
Court is very cavalier in treating the steps of the proportionality analysis, and in specifying the relative 
strength of its variables.76 
The proportionality test, in this field, is not a heuristic device to reach the right decision. Indeed, 
the outcome of this contrived proportionality calculus is not falsifiable, but only opinable or 
contestable. Instead of selecting the outcome of the decision, the balancing provides a malleable 
template that shapes only its supporting reasoning. In the particular circumstances of this dispute, 
Habermas’s critique to the notion of proportionality rings true: ‘[in the proportionality test, v]alues 
must be brought into a transitive order with other values from case to case. Because there are no 
rational standards for this, weighing takes place either arbitrarily or unreflectively, according to 
customary standards and hierarchies’.77 The factual matrix of the Google case is, ab initio, hard to 
frame as a stand-off between established fundamental rights. 
What bothered Mr Costeja, in whose honour the Streisand-effect78 should be re-named, was not 
the existence of that piece of news in the public domain, buried as it was at p. 23 of an old magazine. 
Of course, the real problem was his unflattering ‘Google-identity’ or ‘Google-footprint’; consequently, 
he requested that Google obey, to an extent, to his instructions on which aspects of his web-relevant 
persona should pop out first through a name-search. The ‘right to be forgotten’ tag is misleading, and 
so is the reference to the removal of the link from the results: what really mattered is that the 
                                                          
76 Frantziou n 61, 8: ‘while Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter suggest the creation of some obligations for EU 
institutions and Member States, they do not specify what the role of private actors such as Google should be in 
the enforcement of the relevant standards, or what limitations to these rights are acceptable and how they 
ought to be balanced against other, equally fundamental, rights’. 
77 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT 1996), 259 ff. 
78 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streisand_effect.  
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bothering results came on top. Had the infamous links been listed at page 23 of the Google research 
results, Mr Costeja would have just not cared, exactly as he presumably did not care in 2009 about 
the 1998 print publication of the very same tainting news. There is some truth in connecting one’s 
rights to an apparently circumstantial fact like Google-ranking: after all, ‘to be seen is … to be highly 
ranked’,79 and this author (and this Journal) would plausibly resent discovering that Google Scholar 
does not host a link to the electronic version of this article, or that it is shows it at page 23 of an author-
based search.80 The idea that Google can act as arbitrary gatekeeper of all information available online, 
including personal data, justifies the attempts to brace its power as a matter of policy.81 
Perhaps Google v Spain announces a nascent fundamental right to the fairness, accuracy or 
representativeness of our digital persona. If so, the judgment should explain – through proportionality 
– why this right trumps Google’s interest to carry out its distinctive line of business, through a lawful 
collection of lawfully published content. Clearly, Google’s business performance has unintended 
consequences on somebody’s life, which are perceived as unfair even if they derive from lawful facts 
and acts. Google’s mind-blowingly efficient archiving and sorting activity are treated by the Court as 
the kind of dangerous conduct that, although legal per se, imposes a surplus of responsibility on the 
subject.82 In turn, online personality is deemed to be so vulnerable that it deserves protection also 
against certain lawful acts.83 
                                                          
79 Laidlaw n 62, 125. 
80 Litigation based on low search ranking was brought, without success, in the USA. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007); Kinder-start.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WE 21464568 (W.D. 
Okla. May 27, 2003).   
81 Andrew L Shapiro, The control revolution: How the Internet is putting individuals in charge and changing the 
world we know (PublicAffairs 1999) 225: ‘In a democratic society, those who control access to information have 
a responsibility to support the public interest’. 
82 Laidlaw n 62, 137, referring to the notion that search engines attracts criticism ‘for being good at what they 
do’. 
83 This is one step further from the AG’s remark that ‘the universal scope of the information contributes to the 
harm being potentially more acute than that suffered, for example, by means of a conventional medium’ (see 
eDate n 4, para 48). 
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In the folds of the Court’s reasoning lays the idea that, in a context of obsolescence of public 
authorities, Google must operate as a quasi-public authority.84 Therefore, it has non-reciprocal and 
non-contractual obligations towards its stakeholders (both the users and the persons affected by its 
activity). Alternatively, Google’s duties can be framed as a regulatory brace imposed on a quasi-
monopolistic actor with predominant power over information and public opinion.85 In both 
constructions, the critical element is Google’s de facto control over a public good.86 This notion, 
however reasonable and legitimate, is not the result of balancing, but a regulatory choice. Consider 
Lord Brown’s dissent, concerning the UK Supreme Court’s use of proportionality to review the 
requirement that visa be granted only to foreign couples when both partners are at least 21 years old 
(to prevent forced marriages at an earlier age): 
What value … is to be attached to preventing a single forced marriage? What cost should each 
disappointed couple be regarded as paying? Really these questions are questions of policy and 
should be for government rather than us.87 
The argument here is not that Google Spain was wrong on the merits. The crucial point is how much 
novelty the Court has nonchalantly reined through legislator-like discretion, simply dangling 
proportionality before the beholders. The Court combined the right to private life and the right to a 
lawful use of personal data (neither of which was breached by the publication) to enforce an 
unprecedented right, in unprecedented circumstances and implicating an unprecedented role for 
                                                          
84 Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence 
of the State’ (2009) 11 International Studies Review 205. 
85 Wolfgang Schulz, Thorsten Held and Arne Laudien, ‘Search Engines as Gatekeepers of Public Communication: 
Analysis of the German Framework Applicable to Internet Search Engines Including Media Law and Anti-Trust 
Law’ (2005) 6 GLJ 1418. 
86 Laidlaw n 62, 126: ‘The act of framing a user’s information experience makes search engines indispensable to 
access to information on the Internet thus elevating their product to public good status’, pointing to the 
discussion in Lucas D Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Shaping the Web: Why the politics of search engines 
matters’ (2000) 16(3) Inf. Soc. 169. 
87 R (Quila and another) v Sec of State for the Home Dept [2011] UKSC 45, para 91 of the dissent. 
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Google, and in the process established Google’s unprecedented duty to arbiter individual applications 
of data removal. 
In other words, there is no manifest error in the static assessment of the values at stake and of 
the relative restrictions entailed by the status quo. What is unsatisfactory is the lack of reasoning 
regarding the proportionality of the indicated solution (Google’s duty to remove the link upon 
meritorious requests). Proportionality stricto sensu only operates – as seen above – through the 
comparison between the aggregate right-implementation of the status quo and an alternative 
measure. The Court found a putative disproportion in the status quo and jumped to the solution. The 
better option would have been to show that the solution causes a more favourable scenario of right-
implementation. The Court failed to show the critical element of proportionality which is the putative 
advantage of changing (or retaining) the status quo. Nothing suggests that it would have been easy or 
even possible, but it was unavoidable if proportionality is taken seriously. The result of attributing 
duties to Google is perhaps reasonable, but given the circumstances it would be preferable that the 
regulator had done that88 or that the Court had appealed to the reasonableness of the decision, rather 
than to its putative proportionality. 
4. Low-intensity actions with momentous reach. Protecting collateral victims of internet 
measures 
Proportionality does not compare values, but marginal variations of value-realisation entailed by 
alternative states of the world (induced or mandated by identified normative measures). However, as 
argued in the previous section, internet-based activities do not lend themselves to the intuitive 
generalisations that allow reviewers to attach quantitative judgments to the realisation of rights. 
Deprived of workable comparisons, proportionality misses its critical hinge. 
                                                          
88 Shapiro n 81, 225. 
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This difficulty was prefigured in Lindqvist (where the low-intensity threat to privacy was multiplied 
by the accessibility of online content, causing a formal disproportion that required a policy-oriented 
ruling). A less risky assessment was necessary in Schecke.89 The applicants claimed that the publication 
online of their companies’ names among the recipients of EU funding (within the Common Agricultural 
Policy) was unnecessarily restrictive of the company’s privacy. The values involved were the public’s 
interest in knowing the exact allocation of EU funds, the Union’s duty to transparency and the 
recipients’ interest to privacy. In that occasion, however, the problem was solved through simple 
Pareto-optimisation. The status quo entailing the diffusion of unnecessary information, it was 
sufficient to reduce or qualify the range of published data to increase the implementation of the right 
to privacy without decreasing the enjoyment of the concurring values. 
When Pareto-optimisation cannot occur, however, internet cases reveal their non-manageability 
through balancing. A case on point is L’Oréal v eBay, which mixes the Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning in 
one judgment. Apparently, the case revolved around a purely Type 2 issue and regarded fundamental 
rights only tangentially. Nonetheless, the involvement of several stakeholders and several 
fundamental rights makes it ideal to illustrate the elusiveness of digital litigation to balancing 
parsing.90 
L’Oréal sued eBay for unlawful use of its trademark. eBay pays the likes of Google to have 
sponsored links appear alongside normal links as results of keyword searches. eBay’s sponsored links 
advertise items sold on its auction platform, many of which branded. Therefore, the relative 
trademarks are among the words that eBay selects and for which it pays Google. When private parties 
sell counterfeit goods through eBay, eBay cannot be liable directly (to avoid the practice it should set 
up a preventive filtering system, something it can refuse to do under the safe harbour of Art. 15 of the 
                                                          
89 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063. 
90 Contrast with Case C-323/09 Interflora v Mark & Spencer [2011] ECR I-8625, which also concerned the use of 
a trademark by a competitor. However, the dispute was essentially between two competitors and did not involve 
the interests of a wider audience. Hence, the case is only accidentally, not essentially, internet-related.   
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e-Commerce Directive). However, L’Oréal argued that eBay, by actively buying advertising services for 
the search-word ‘l’oréal’, used its brand and exploited or at least abetted the sale of counterfeit 
products – an indirect breach of trademarks rights. 
The Type 2 question, in short, was whether the use of the brand L’Oréal by eBay qualified as ‘use’ 
under the relevant EU norms on trademark.91 If so, it could be objected by the trademark-holder, if 
unlawful. Whether in 1989 the EU legislator could possibly conceive the purchase of search-embedded 
advertising through keywords that can correspond to brands is beyond the point. The rationale of the 
EU regime concerned the IP-holder’s power to prevent third parties from unauthorised use, hence the 
regulatory connection of pre-internet rules could occur without much conceptual trouble.92  
The Type 1 component of the dispute, instead, was less straightforward and did not emerge in the 
judgment. It did, however, in the Opinion of the Advocate General, who reminded at the outset that 
eBay listings are covered by the freedom of expression and information, under Artice 11 of the 
Charter.93 Jääskinen conceded that freedom of expression cannot normally justify a breach of property 
rights, including trademarks. However, 
the protection of trade mark proprietor’s rights in the context of electronic commerce may not 
take forms that would infringe the rights of innocent users of an electronic marketplace or leave 
the alleged infringer without due possibilities of opposition and defence.94 
Accordingly, it would be unfairly severe to set up a system of shorthand remedies for the benefit of 
IP-holders, if sellers of genuine goods were adversely affected unnecessarily. This remark reveals the 
endemic problem of regulation of all internet-related conduct: any standard potentially applies to 
millions of users.  It is impossible to tell a priori innocent bystanders from fraudulent users, and fine-
                                                          
91 Specifically, Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation No 40/94. 
92 As it seemingly did in Google France n 34, holding that Google’s use of certain brands to populate sponsored 
ads qualified as ‘use’ under EU trademark law, and benefitted in principle from the safe harbour of Article 14 of 
the e-commerce Directive. 
93 L’Oréal n 22, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 49. 
94 Ibid, para 158. Emphasis added. 
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tune regulation to exclude false positive. Likewise, ex post facto prosecution is unviable. The slippery 
slope is around the corner every time regulation of internet behaviour purports to repose on a 
seemingly neutral balancing of values, because the sheer scale of massive behaviour online makes it 
impossible to strike a balance that is acceptable to all people whose fundamental rights are affected. 
In short, any regulation of the activity ‘using internet’ is inevitably over-inclusive with respect to 
the regulatory goal pursued. It is as if all people ‘breathing’ were required to avoid drinking, just 
because all drivers are certainly ‘breathers’. Unfortunately, there seems to be no better way to 
circumscribe internet regulation ratione personae or ratione materiae. As a result, proportionate 
balancing is normally and demonstrably impossible to achieve; all solutions are disproportionate. This 
is so since internet-regulating measures have such a massive inefficiency-creating externality (i.e., 
they create useless restrictions for users whose action is irrelevant to the regulatory purpose pursued) 
that it is impossible to prove their proportionality. Hence, it is often impossible to demonstrate that 
internet regulations – let alone court decisions – arbitrating between competing rights secure an 
overall positive balance of right-enjoyment compared to the status quo. As a consequence, it is the 
task of the regulator to deliberately assess the various trade-offs, none of which is proportionate in 
the sense implicated by the proportionality test, and choose the preferable norms as a matter of 
conscious policy-making. 
To its credit, the findings of the Court are rarely the strained result of an impracticable review of 
proportionality. More commonly, they reflect indeed a policy choice,95 often dictated by the concern 
of avoiding false positives and minimise the number of stakeholders whose interest is sacrificed in the 
trade-off. The Court in Lindqvist spared billions of web-users from the regime applicable to those who 
transfer personal information to third countries. In Google Spain, the Court operated similarly: when 
the individual’s concern is plausible, Google’s duty to act upon it is the more convenient option, as 
                                                          
95 Endicott n 6, (referring to judges using proportionality): ‘They assess the value of pursuing public purposes in 
the way that the legislature or the government has done or proposes to do’. 
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opposed to sacrificing her fundamental right, or asking the news outlet to retract a lawful exercise of 
the freedom to impart information. This idea of (utilitarian) convenience is candidly spelled out in the 
preamble of Directive 2001/2996 on copyright protection in the information society: 
In the digital environment … the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by third 
parties for infringing activities. In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such 
infringing activities to an end. Therefore, without prejudice to any other sanctions and remedies 
available, rightholders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against an 
intermediary who carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter 
in a network. … The conditions and modalities relating to such injunctions should be left to the 
national law of the Member States.97 
There is a clear utilitarian foundation to the rightholders’ right to seek court injunctions ordering 
intermediaries to remove the breach. The corresponding intermediaries’ duty does not stem from 
their legal responsibility or the optimal balance between their rights and duties, but from their being 
‘best placed’ to counter illegality. The intermediaries have quasi-public responsibilities reflecting their 
quasi-public authority: it is easy to draw a parallel with the Google Spain decision, as constructed in 
the previous section. 
In L’Oréal v eBay the rights of the legion of eBay sellers could not be curtailed by preventive 
restrictions. eBay is held liable for infringement of IP rights only if is aware of it, for instance when it 
cooperates with the user on the preparation of the listings. A comparison with the case Coty98 helps 
to elucidate the special features of L’Oréal, a case that is essentially internet-related and thus, 
arguably, unfit for proportionality. In Coty, the main proceedings emerged from a similar factual 
background: an eBay user purchased counterfeit merchandise and sought reparation from the seller. 
                                                          
96 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, 10-19. 
97 Recital 59 (emphasis added). 
98 Case C-580/13 Coty Germany (judgment of 16 July 2015) 
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eBay revealed the identity of the seller, who denied involvement in the specific transaction. The 
purchaser then required the bank with which the seller held an account (registered with eBay) to 
disclose the holder’s identity. The bank refused, invoking banking secrecy. The Court was asked to 
determine whether EU law allows banking secrecy to be upheld at the expense of IP protection,99 and 
set out to ‘reconcile the requirements of the protection of different fundamental rights, namely the 
right to an effective remedy and the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the right to 
protection of personal data.’100 The Court held that a domestic law authorising banks to invoke 
banking secrecy unconditionally can frustrate disproportionally the rights to intellectual property – by 
making it impossible to pursue an effective remedy in case of breach.101 
The outcome resulted from a plain application of the proportionality test. The domestic law was 
considered capable of obliterating even the essence of the rights to property and to an effective 
remedy, in breach of Article 52(1) of the Charter. This decision differs from L’Oréal because the 
incidence of internet on the dispute was accidental. The dispute was between the bank and the 
purchaser, and the interests involved were just two: ‘First, the right to information and, second, the 
right to protection of personal data must be complied with.’102 This case, in short, did not display some 
of the common features of those disputes in which internet activities are central, and which for this 
reason escape moderation through proportionality. 
The mythology of proportionality pervades also the cases concerning infringements of IP rights 
through peer-to-peer online activities. In the main proceedings, the IP-owners (directly or through 
dedicated associations) required, alternatively, that internet providers disclose their customers’ 
identity (Promusicae; Bonnier) or monitor their activity so as to prevent infringements (SABAM; 
Scarlet). The Court, in all cases, resorted diffusely to a constitutional reasoning, claiming to consider 
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all fundamental rights involved. Generally, several rights of several subjects were at stake: the 
property rights of IP-holders and their right to seek judicial protection thereof, the right to conduct 
business of the internet service providers, the right to privacy and to exchange information of the 
internet users (the latter arising only in the monitoring-related cases). 
According to the arguments presented so far, the essential matrix of these cases is sufficient to 
redoubt of their compatibility with the orthodox three-step proportionality routine. A short account 
confirms the doubts as meritorious.  
In Promusicae, the Court recalled that it is the Member States’ duty to implement a Directive 
choosing measures which strike ‘a fair balance’ between the various fundamental rights and respect 
proportionality.103 The Court confirmed this guideline in Bonnier, adding that an order for disclosure 
of personal data is not precluded if, among other things, ‘the reasons for the measure outweigh the 
nuisance or other harm which the measure may entail for the person affected by it or for some other 
conflicting interest’.104 These guidelines are very vague and pass the buck to the national authorities, 
which are better positioned to assess the fairness of the balance in specific cases. This implicitly 
challenges the idea that there is only one balanced option, to be identified through proportionality 
testing. 
In SABAM and Scarlet, the Court mixed subsumption and proportionality. It plainly stated that the 
sought-after filtering systems would require the internet service providers to carry out general 
monitoring, in breach of the e-commerce Directive.105 It then stressed certain characters of the 
filtering system (costly, permanent, complicated) that automatically made it unnecessarily 
burdensome106 and patently unable to strike a fair balance between the rights of IP-holders and 
internet providers.107 The rights of the users were mentioned only ad abundantiam. This finding is 
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impossible to square with an orthodox proportionality test. The Court simply noticed that an 
obligation to monitor would impose a significant burden on internet providers, without elaborating 
on the degree of benefit that it would bring to property rights. Nor did the decisions account for the 
FR-balance of the preferable scenario (ample freedom of conducting business coupled by widespread 
disrespect of IP rights). There is not even a hint of comparison on which to hang a proper finding of 
proportionality. Likewise, the Court produced a cringeworthy non sequitur when it stated that 
requiring providers to set up ‘a complicated, costly, permanent computer system … would also be 
contrary to [the requirement] that measures … should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly’.108 
Nothing in the Court’s reasoning supported the conclusion that the measure was stricto sensu 
disproportionate, let alone unnecessary (that is, wasteful) in light of its purpose. 
In sum, these peer-to-peer cases show that the Court either delegated proportionality to domestic 
courts or recited its elements as if it were a half-forgotten due diligence checklist. It is not 
preposterous to suggest that the findings were not truly reached through proportionality, and that it 
was just cited to inject legitimacy ex post deciso. 
In another case (UPC109), the intermediary was not eBay, and the alleged IP infringement was not 
camouflaged among millions of innocent ads. The intermediary, an internet provider, was ordered by 
a national court to block the users’ access to a website streaming pirated movies. In this dispute, the 
possibility of a blanket shutdown did not trouble the Court: the website was clearly up to no good, 
hence there was no risk of false positives being unfairly affected by the injunction. The balancing with 
the hypothetical countervailing rights was briefly accounted as follows: 
… in order to prevent the fundamental rights recognised by EU law from precluding the 
adoption of an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the national 
                                                          
108 Scarlet n 23, para 48; Sabam n 24, para 50 (emphasis added). 
109 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (judgment of 27 March 2014). 
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procedural rules must provide a possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the 
court once the implementing measures taken by the internet service provider are known.110 
Even in a case like Schecke, where the outcome is based on a proper proportionality analysis (to the 
point that the Court assessed the necessity of the measure challenged, and suggested a less restrictive 
alternative),111 the underlying problem was more mundane. Because any information on internet 
receives a disproportionate exposure, anything uploaded beyond the strict necessary breaches 
somebody’s rights significantly, even when the additional disclosure is not particularly harmful in and 
of itself. 
The fragmentation of practical responsibility for the downstream consequence of online conduct 
is difficult to decipher with certainty. Resultantly, the vast disproportion that can occur (in size, 
timespan, reach, effects, harmfulness) between conduct and events makes it impossible to apportion 
legal responsibility according to a principled scheme, like that resulting from the proportionality test. 
The northern star of the Court seems the minimisation of costs, something very different from the 
maximisation of rights that proportionality promises. Responsibility is regularly attributed to those 
who suffer the least from bearing it. Slippery slopes are regularly shunned, a pragmatic result that 
betrays the Court’s preference for sustainability over principles. There seems to be a twist, however, 
which confirms the impossibility to refer to a unique method of balancing: millions of internet users 
are allowed to sell goods (L’Oréal) and exchange files (SABAM) freely, even if this relatively 
unregulated practice occasionally encroaches the rights of private individuals. When at stake is a 
public interest, instead, the focus shifts, and the priority becomes defusing internet’s multiplying 
effect of disorderly conduct. The Court held in Carmen Media Group: 
a prohibition measure covering any offer of games of chance via the internet may, in principle, be 
regarded as suitable for pursuing the legitimate objectives of preventing incitement to squander 
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money on gambling, combating addiction to the latter and protecting young persons, even though 
the offer of such games remains authorised through more traditional channels.112 
An apparent exception to this very pragmatic approach is the case Digital Rights v. Ireland,113 in which 
the Court annulled the Data Retention directive, in a flamboyant exercise of proportionality testing. 
However, the Court maybe tried a bit too hard to sell this decision as an fearless application of 
proportionality. Consider the following statement, relating to the minimum period for which 
telecommunications operators must retain the data: 
that period is set at between a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 24 months, but it is not 
stated that the determination of the period of retention must be based on objective criteria in 
order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary.114 
This remark purports to prove too much: why should an EU Directive specify that its application must 
comply with the principle of proportionality or respect for fundamental rights? Proportionality is a 
general principle of EU law that applies, by default and not upon request, to the interpretation, 
implementation and application of EU measures. Respect for fundamental rights is already a binding 
principle on State acts.115 If the Directive leaves a huge margin to State implementation, Article 51(1) 
of the Charter suffices to prevent the risk that implementing measures breach fundamental rights. 
Certainly the potential breach entailed by defective implementation must be attributed to the 
Member States, not the Directive. FR-based review should hit the implementing measures, not the 
implemented act, unless the latter mandates a breach of human rights, quod non in the specific case. 
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In truth, it is plausible to concede that the Directive was probably badly drafted, and that a tighter 
wording with respect to the FR-implications could help Member States to implement it appropriately, 
achieving more coherence across the Union. Ultimately, the inefficient (i.e., disproportionate) 
measures were the national implementing acts but the Court, perhaps knowing that the Directive 
would necessarily need an overhaul in any event, applied the proportionality directly to it, in a display 
of righteousness that conveyed the notion that the EU is under a rule of FR-law and the Court is ready 
to enforce it unceremoniously. 
As for the proportionality test itself, this case was relatively simple, with essentially two interests 
in tension: the privacy of the data subjects and the public security.116 The duty of telecommunication 
providers to retain personal information was in fact a mere exception to the former for the benefit of 
the latter, not an autonomous element for the balancing. In essence, the dispute hinged on the 
regulatory limits of the exception. Using the privacy-restrictive scenario allowed (if not required) by 
the Directive as the status quo baseline, the Court performed an approximate proportionality analysis. 
The Court employed several degree-qualifying terms, which seemed to set the scene for an 
intensity-assessment. Protection of personal data plays an ‘important role’ and the Directive causes a 
‘serious’ interference, hence the Court’s judicial review thereon ‘should be strict’117; moreover, the 
fight against organised crime and terrorism is ‘of the utmost importance’.118 The suitability of data 
retention – in general – for the purposes of fighting crime went uncontested,119 but the necessity of 
its limitation under the Directive – in particular – was very much contestable. The Court even noted 
that ‘derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so 
                                                          
116 That the Directive’s goal was certified as being the protection of public order and security is another point of 
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far as is strictly necessary’.120 This statement is presumably a reminder of how important the necessity 
step is, otherwise it would indicate that limitations of certain rights other than data protection can be 
justified without being strictly necessary. 
The Court then introduced a spurious element at the outset of the necessity test: the obligation 
for the EU legislator to provide in its acts minimum safeguards against the risk of abuse of fundamental 
rights.121 This unprecedented legislative duty is borrowed ‘by analogy’ from the case-law of the ECtHR 
regarding vague domestic statutes, which unduly empower executive authorities to decide the scope 
of FR-limitation.122 However, this parallel oddly overlooks the nature of Directives as acts which, by 
definition, are not directly applicable in the Member States. The positive duty that the ECtHR bestows 
on national legislators cannot be attributed inattentively by analogy to the EU legislator drafting 
Directives. Directives require national implementation, so there is no analogy. Reasonably, the 
required safeguards must be included precisely in the national statutes implementing the Directives, 
at the hand of national authorities. 
The call for clauses of minimum protection is also problematic because it injects an inherent vice 
in the proportionality reasoning. Alexy criticises similar instructions: 
A guarantee of a minimum, if not determined by balancing, would, indeed, not be the same 
as optimization. It would, however, not only be different from optimization but also different 
from proportionality. It would not be an alternative interpretation of proportionality. Rather, 
it would be an alternative incompatible with proportionality. One who recommends the 
substitution of a guarantee of a minimum for the principle of proportionality in the narrower 
sense is recommending the abolishment of this principle.123 
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Even allowing that this requirement be compatible with proportionality, the notion that the Directive 
should have included minimum safeguards (something it certainly did not) skewed irremediably the 
necessity analysis towards a finding of breach. The Court limited itself to note that the Directive 
applied to a wide and largely undifferentiated range of communications, means of communications 
and users.124 Moreover, the Directive did not set a specific requirement that persons whose data ought 
to be retained be suspected of a crime,125 any objective criteria to calibrate the State’s access to the 
data retained,126 or any guidelines on how to restrict domestically the period of retention, down from 
the over-inclusive range provided in the Directive.127 
The Court hence concluded peremptorily that the Directive caused an interference with FRs, and 
the interference was not ‘precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to 
what is strictly necessary’.128 Failure to meet the necessity requirement entailed a failure to respect 
the proportionality principle and, ultimately, led to the annulment of the act. 
In this case, it is difficult to take the proportionality reasoning seriously, for the reasons stated 
above. This judgment features, in all likelihood, in the Court’s trend of using proportionality-based 
arguments for policy-based decisions. Technically, the enhanced necessity analysis, including the duty 
to provide normative safeguards, made for an atypical proportionality test that cannot be traced back 
to the classic model. There is an easy way to appreciate how the Court used the proportionality 
narrative unorthodoxly. Even if the measure failed the necessity test, the Court did not even try to 
identify alternative measures which were reasonably available and equally effective to fight crime. In 
sum, the Court condemned the status quo without proving with any precision that another possible 
counterfactual scenario could secure a better overall balance of FR-protection. 
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The Court held as much implicitly, noting the Directive’s over-inclusiveness. However, it is fair to 
suppose that narrowing down the scope of the retention to an optimal level was a difficult task, hence 
it could not be assumed that simply because the Directive balance appeared unfortunate a better 
solution was readily available: perhaps it was not. Possibly, requiring that retention only occur when 
the conduct of the persons involved is suspicious might delimit the investigation and undermine its 
effectiveness. Likewise, the indication that the time-range for the period of retention is excessive 
should have come with a cost-benefit analysis of alternative ranges, or additional criteria to narrow 
the range down domestically. In short, there is no hint of real comparison in the Court’s reasoning, 
which reveals that the Court itself (never mind this author) did not take proportionality seriously 
either.129 
In the landmark decision MGM v Gronkster, the US Supreme Court was called to address the 
liability of internet service providers managing a peer-to-peer platform.130 The Supreme Court frankly 
evaluated the interests at stake and the wider policies (how to prevent technology from fostering 
disdain for intellectual property; how to set a liability regime that does not hinder technology 
advancements). It then based its finding on an openly pragmatic remark: when infringement occurs 
on such scale that individual enforcement is impossible, ‘the only practical alternative’131 is to establish 
the vicarious or secondary liability of the intermediaries which induce the wrongdoing. It remarked 
that the inducement rule was ‘a sensible one for copyright’132 and did not ‘compromise legitimate 
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise’.133 Responsible reasoning tapping on 
common sense, practicality and established legal doctrines produced a well-reasoned and principled 
decision. Nothing suggests that this judgment would have been more legitimate (let alone correct) if 
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it had contained an artificial calculation of the weight of the interests involved and an impressionistic 
comparison of the aggregate weight corresponding to the different rules of liability discussed. 
Proportionality is the result of a good decision, not the other way round. 
5. Conclusions 
The Court is couching its decisions in the familiar jargon used in the balancing of fundamental rights. 
This is understandable, but the recurrent use of proportionality does not evince a fil rouge of the case-
law, nor does it ensure better or more predictable decisions. Sometimes, proportionality is hardly 
recognisable when its use is announced, emptied as it is of any substance. Proportionality balancing 
as such would made sense only if one hoped to find a point of equilibrium, the end of a zero-sum 
game, where any other alternative would be wrong (because comparatively unbalanced). This 
aspiration is futile in the field of internet activities, where various recurring features advise against 
using proportionality balancing as a heuristic tool. 
Namely, balancing often occurs between three or more groups of stakeholders and three or more 
different rights;134 lawful conduct can result in harmful effects that are difficult to gauge factually and 
that, by virtue of the online-multiplier, are hypothetically immense; sweeping judicial precedents are 
likely to affect adversely innocent subjects; very rarely can all rights be preserved through Pareto-
optimising balancing. 
The challenge for the Court, in these conditions, is to let go of the comfortable 
terminology/mythology on proportionality and allocate liability with policy-oriented pragmatism, as it 
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does regularly but covertly. Ultimately, however, the refinement of legal categories cannot be 
entrusted to the Court alone: the incoming regulatory reform of the field is bound to provide more 
guidance (and more precise rules) to judges and EU citizens alike. Regulatory connection with FR-
externalities should not be routinely entrusted courts. Regulators should translate the preferences of 
society regarding technology and take responsibility for choosing a regime that will ineluctably entail 
an indecipherable FR-balance sheet. Governments are allowed and required to make decisions in 
circumstances of radical uncertainties, where beneficial and detrimental effects of a policy cannot be 
proved.135 Difficult choices must be made, possibly outside courtrooms: 
…to rely on courts to rescue legislation can sometimes undermine the integrity of legal reasoning. 
In the interests of regulatory legitimacy and democracy, where a technology has out-run its 
regulatory framework, it might be important to take time out to debate the developments that 
have taken place and to determine how the regulatory framework should be adjusted. Sometimes, 
the social licence for a particular technology needs to be reviewed and revised.136 
Granted, abandoning the FR-metrical discourse in favour of policy-oriented adjudication would have 
its own risks. La Torre rightly noted that if ‘fundamental rights are seen as policies, they will … lose 
their point, which is controlling and limiting State action.’137 
However, limiting the exercise of public authority is hardly the most pressing problem of the 
regulation of internet-related conduct, for the simple reason that public authority is already 
comparatively weaker in this field. What needs urgent management are the interplay between private 
rights and private interests, and the public policy inputs necessary to arbitrate or moderate between 
them. The Google Spain and L’Oréal cases are, in this sense, illustrative of how the difficulty does not 
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lie in the nature of public interference into private conduct, but in the sustainability of a reciprocal 
arrangement between human activities with numerous externalities. 
Ultimately, it is proposed here to discard the ‘mathematical’ proportionality championed by Alexy, 
which has provided the Court for too long with a comfort-zone where anything goes, in terms of legal 
argumentation. If the motivation of the Court’s decisions is after all policy-oriented, there is no 
plausible benefit in their disguise as proportionality calculi. Google Spain is a pragmatical 
apportionment of duties, so is L’Oréal v eBay and to a large extent the other IP-related cases perused 
above. The outlier cases are not symptomatic: UPC spurs from the matter-of-fact consideration that 
the website’s conduct was prima facie illegal; Digital Rights Ireland was really a revise-and-resubmit 
note to the EU legislator with a perfunctory proportionality recitation. 
Certainly, more cases in the future will decide digital cases through lip-serving references to 
proportionality. This knee-jerk trend is a disservice to the rule of law and obfuscates the legal 
reasoning of the Court, because internet disputes are bound to fit uncomfortably in the 
proportionality straitjacket. Better, the proportionality test is bound to fit too loose or too tight on 
internet-based realities. Ad hoc adjustments are routinely necessary, to the point that it is not clear 
anymore why courts should stick to a test that systematically needs à la carte stretching. 
Habermas criticised proportionality balancing for undermining the claim to correctness of 
adjudication of principles. Proportionality-based reasoning, in short, would not reflect the legal 
categories of right and wrong, but the policy categories of adequateness and opportunity, thus 
depriving FRs of their status of legal principles.138 Alexy’s rebuttal is convincing, in general: 
proportionality is better than nothing. The three-step test, in fact, envisages ‘abundant criteria to label 
a proposition as correct or incorrect’139: it provides an articulate template for judicial reasoning (a 
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‘structured form of inquiry140) in cases where free-style reasoning could be conceived as 
unprincipled.141 In his words, 
[proportionality is] an argument form of rational legal discourse. As such, it is indispensable 
in order to introduce ‘order into legal thought’. It makes clear which points are decisive and 
how these points are related to one another.142 
This is undisputable. What makes this remark less compelling in the cases studied here is the set of 
idiosyncrasies of human affairs in the digital arena. Because optimisation is not a realistic task, 
proportionality cannot operate its ‘ordering’ effect and becomes a hollow formula, recited to infuse 
legitimacy by way of a recurrent mythology, rather through authoritative reasoning. If the 
assessments of necessity and strict proportionality are based on fuzzy and truncated reasoning 
(intensity of infringements is not measured; alternative measures are not explored and compared with 
the status quo; the interests of various groups are contrasted ‘impressionistically’ and not analytically; 
the reasoning shifts uncontrollably and inadvertently from the interest of the dispute parties the 
interest of society at large, etc); proportionality is not better than nothing, it is worse. 
Habermas’s warning applies to these cases. Whereas the Court’s engagement in policy-based 
balancing is not to blame (what else is available?), less agreeable is its masquerading as neutral-
looking proportionality.143 If free-style judicial reasoning is the best option (if the regulator stalls, that 
probably is), then indeed free judicial reasoning is preferable to reasoning constrained by formulaic 
incrustations.  
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